Statute, institutions, devolution and Constitution

103

Governing as close as possible, guaranteeing rights, assuming responsibilities

Levrig 2027
Trajectory 2027 – 2032

NB: «For the sake of fluidity and concision, In this text, the masculine is used to encompass all genders.».

The essentials

The devolution proposal expressed by Yes Breizh is neither a disguised proposal for independence nor a simple administrative decentralization. It organizes a democratic devolution To transfer to a reunified Brittany the normative, administrative and financial powers that it can exercise more effectively, while maintaining in the sphere of the central State the sovereign powers, the guarantee of fundamental freedoms and intelligent solidarity between the different parts of France.

The objective can therefore be formulated as follows: a self-governing Brittany within the Republic and the European Union, unified, responsible for its choices and organized in a polycentric manner. The target model can eventually include a Brittany Assembly, building on the existing Assembly, an accountable executive, the current Départements associated with about twenty local areas (pays), strong communes, and independent counter-powers.

The project progresses in three acts.

• The first is possible within the current constitutional framework: reunifying Brittany, creating a community with special status and simplifying the organization.
• The second transfers, by devolution, the competencies accompanied by the corresponding resources, from one domain to another.
• The third article in the Constitution establishes a clearly limited and guaranteed Breton regulatory power.

This progression is in response to a requirement of seriousness: not asking for a blank check.

And the seriousness of Yes Breizh, before any constitutional revision, is to identify the competencies reserved to the State, define those shared and assigned to Brittany, publish them, quantify them, and debate them in order to implement them no later than 2032.

1. Why reopen the institutional question?

A crisis of trust that calls for responsibility

The Political Confidence Barometer CEVIPOF¹, In the survey, conducted in February 2026, vague 17 describes a national distrust at its highest level: 76 % of the people surveyed believe that democracy is not working well, 87 % that political leaders care little or not at all about the people, and trust in the National Assembly falls to 20 %.

In the same survey, the mayor remains the most trustworthy political figure: 60 %, compared to 44 % for the departmental councillor, 42 % for the regional councillor, 34 % for the MP and 18 % for the President of the Republic. An electoral survey in March 2026 also gives the mayor and municipal councillors 69 % of trust, compared to 48 % for the MP and 23 % for the President of the Republic.

Certainly, these figures do not justify the granting of autonomy through devolution. However, they do show that proximity, the decision-maker’s identification and the possibility of assessing the results count. For Yes Breizh, devolution must specifically link three elements that are too often separated today:

• the power to decide;
• the means of financing;
• the obligation to respond with results.

Uniformity does not address all realities

Brittany faces a number of issues whose intensity and interconnectedness justify coherent policies at the local level: the maritime façade, fishing and ports, agriculture and the agro-food industry, tensions over coastal land, energy, cross-peninsular mobility, cybersecurity, the Breton languages, and the balance between metropolises, medium-sized cities, islands, and rural areas.

For Yes Breizh, it is not a matter of claiming that these issues are unknown elsewhere. It is a matter of noting that Brittany must be able to combine them in a long-term strategy, rather than relying on sectoral decisions made by different administrations.

From a sense of dispossession to the ability to act

The intervention of Gaël Briand² Before the Regional Council on December 13, 2023, he linked the democratic crisis to a form of dispossession: residents can debate housing, languages, or land ownership without having, at the Breton level, the legal instruments to act fully. This reading complements the institutional diagnosis: autonomy is not a symbol, but rather a concrete ability to choose, finance, and assume a policy.

Centralization, decentralization, differentiation, devolution, autonomy

Notion	What she changes	Main limit
Centralisation	The central state acts locally through its departments and prefectures.	The center remains the decision-maker.
Decentralisation	A community administers the powers granted by law.	It has little own normative power and limited resources.
Differentiating	Rules or competencies may vary depending on the territories considered by the central state.	The derogation is generally decided or authorized by the central state.
Devolution	A sustainable bloc of powers is entrusted to a Breton democratic institution.	It requires a clear distribution of responsibilities and financial guarantees.
Autonomy	The community has its own normative power in matters guaranteed by its statute.	Its scope depends on the constitutional and organic text; it does not equate to sovereignty.

For Yes Breizh, devolution is the process; responsible autonomy is the democratic organization that it leads to.

2. The doctrine: unity, subsidiarity, responsibility

Autonomy in the French Republic

The Yes Breizh project maintains a common constitutional order.

Thus, citizenship, fundamental rights, the currency, defense, diplomacy, the principles of justice, national security, and France’s international commitments remain guaranteed at the central state level. Brittany would not institute either internal borders or exclusive citizenship, nor discrimination based on origin.

Nevertheless, Yes Breizh believes that political unity does not require that all decisions be uniform. This unity requires that fundamental rights be common and that responsibilities exercised be clear and that disputes be arbitrated by the law.

A subsidiarity with a two-way effect

For Yes Breizh, competence devolves to Brittany when its exercise there is more coherent, more effective, and more democratically controllable. It remains with the State when equality of rights, security, a national externalization, or an international commitment impose it.

The same principle must protect communes and the life basins from Rennais or Nantes-style centralization. Devolution does not consist of replacing Paris with Rennes or Nantes. Local policies, their implementation, and a share of resources must remain at the local level whenever relevant.

A decision accompanied by its means

Any devolution or transfer involves simultaneously: the legal authority, the necessary services and data, the personnel, a dynamic resource and a contradictory method of evaluating the charges.

No devolution without funding; no resource without accountability.

3. A constitutional trajectory Yes Breizh in three acts

Act I — Reunify and simplify in the current law

The first act aims to obtain a «Commune of Brittany reunified with special status." » within the framework of Article 72 of the Constitution. It brings together regional competences and, according to the democratic choice made, all or part of the departmental competences. Corsica provides here a legal reference closer than New Caledonia: Corsica is a so-called metropolitan community with a special status, endowed with separate institutions.

As for the repeal of Pétain’s decision to separate the Loire-Atlantique and Nantes from the Duchy of Brittany… from Brittany, Yes Breizh admits that reunification requires a fair democratic process, involving the populations concerned and the communities, with an intelligible question and explicit consequences before the vote.

Thus, Yes Breizh suggests that after reunification, a «Plan for Sustainable Development of Brittany (PADDB)» would provide coherence that would be compatible with choices regarding housing, land, the coastline, infrastructure, mobility, energy, and local balances.

Act II — Transferring complete functions by devolution

The second step transfers policies by functional blocks. It is necessary to avoid entrusting the objective to Brittany while leaving the standard, taxation or operator to Paris. Each devolution law includes an inventory of the standards, budgets, staff, assets, contracts and information systems transferred.

An indicative calendar can prioritize the areas where coherence at the Brittany level is most demonstrable: languages and culture; training and guidance; housing and land; the sea and the coastline; transport and ports; territorial energy; economic development; agriculture and food; prevention and territorial organization of health care.

This stage can combine common law, authorisations, experiments and legislative transfers. Each block would be evaluated after three to five years based on indicators published before its entry into force.

Act III — Guaranteeing autonomy through the Constitution

The third act creates a constitutional foundation specific to Brittany, complemented by an organic statute and a Fundamental Law of Brittany. This organises the institutions, procedures and internal guarantees within the recognised autonomous space; it does not substitute either the French Constitution or the law of the European Union.

This architecture is preferable to a vague formula that leaves the essential matters for later. The electoral body and Parliament must be aware of the matters to be revised beforehand, the central state’s reserves, funding, and mechanisms for resolving disputes.

From political mandate to legal decision

The Scottish government’s program for 2026 unequivocally sets out the scope of the vote: a majority in the electorate would, in its view, constitute a mandate to obtain the transfer of power necessary to organize a referendum.

Without translating its independentist objective into practice, this method illuminates a useful requirement for Yes Breizh: the requested mandate must announce before the election the subject of the negotiation, the relevant competences, the relevant location, and the ratification procedure. An electoral victory would thus open the way for negotiations and would politically oblige its proponents; it would not constitute an automatic adoption of the statute nor an exception to the constitutional rules.

The proposed trajectory therefore distinguishes two consents. A first mandate authorizes negotiating and preparing a complete project, accompanied by the transfer of resources and guarantees. A second consent concerns the finalized text, following a contradictory debate and legal expertise. This sequence protects both the right of the Bretons and the Bretons to decide on their organization in Brittany and the respect of the Constitution of the French Republic.

The revision procedure

For Yes Breizh, autonomy with genuine legislative power will require a revision of the Constitution under Article 89: a vote of the same text by the National Assembly and the Senate, then approval by referendum or, for a proposed revision, by the Parliament convened in Congress with a majority of three-fifths of the votes cast.

The consultation of the Breton population will not initially replace this national procedure. But this consultation would give it the indispensable legitimacy for Brittany. Yes Breizh therefore proposes a «double legitimacy” » : Explicit consent in Brittany and adoption according to the French constitutional procedure.

It is clear, however, that if, in the end, the French Parliament, meeting in Congress, refused what Brittany had decided for itself, this would create a major political problem.

4. Who does what?

According to Yes Breizh, the distribution would follow the logic of reserved subjects: the Constitution and the organic law would list them.³ the competencies retained by the central state; the shared matters would be precisely organized; the balance would, in principle, be governed by Brittany. This residual clause, inspired by the Scottish model, would thus avoid an indefinite succession of sporadic transfers and would remain subject to superior law and judicial control.

Block	Main areas	Guarantees
Reserved for the central state	Nationality, defense, diplomacy, currency, criminal and civil principles, national security, constitutional freedoms, international commitments.	Equal application of rights; constitutional and European control.
Devolved to Brittany	Infrastructure, housing, land, regional transport, non-regulated ports, culture and languages, training, economic development, tourism, agriculture, the sea, territorial energy, the environment.	Published Breton standards; evaluation; respect for higher law and for free local administration.
Shared	Health, education, taxation, civil security, work and employment, biodiversity, strategic infrastructure, European cooperation.	Framework laws, conventions, intergovernmental conferences and arbitration mechanism.

To note in addition:

a principle of functional preemptive action:

In a devolved matter, according to Yes Breizh, the Breton standard applies. The central state can intervene only for a constitutionally, European or national reason explicitly motivated. In a shared matter, a national framework law sets out the common guarantees, while Brittany adapts the organization and means.

A strictly regulated safeguard clause:

A temporary intervention by the central state can be envisaged in the event of a serious threat to the freedoms, security, or continuity of essential services. It must be proportionate, limited in time, subject to urgent recourse, and submitted to the Assembly of Brittany.

5. Resources, taxation and solidarity

Autonomy without a proper budget would be fictitious

Brittany must have a substantial share of resources, the rate or the basis of which it determines within the limits provided for by the organic law. The basket can include its own taxes, territorialized fractions of national taxes for Brittany, fees and contributions of solidarity.

The initial transfer would be calculated by an independent and contradictory commission. It would be indexed to the real dynamics of the charges, not to their picture on the day of the transfer.

Solidarity would remain a common principle

National equalization and solidarity would be maintained. But the statute would prohibit social and fiscal dumping (but for the latter it would allow certain dynamic adjustments).⁴National minimum standards could protect fundamental social rights; Brittany could, however, improve them within its own competences and within its own means.

Transparency and budgetary discipline

The consolidated budget would present the flows between the central state, Brittany, and the local authorities. A golden rule would govern the balance of operations, without preventing investment. Fiscal expenditures, guaranteed borrowing, and public-private partnerships would be published and evaluated. Brittany would, however, no longer be involved in French debt for debts created on the subjects devolved after the devolution was implemented.

6. Languages, culture and equality of persons

For Yes Breizh, although French remains the common language in Brittany, Breton and Gallo must enjoy guaranteed protection and public usage in Brittany. This recognition pursues an objective of freedom, transmission and equal access; it does not define an ethnic affiliation.

Language rights are attached to every person, regardless of their origin. They include progressive access to learning, the possibility of using a Breton language with services capable of receiving it, bilingual signage, and support for media and creation.

No person may be deprived of a right or a service for not speaking Breton or Gallo. The obligations imposed on administrations are progressive, proportionate and financed. This formulation directly addresses the constitutional risk of a category of «people» or «community» possessing distinct collective rights.

The equality of dignity among languages cannot remain a mere declaration. The devolution must allow for a genuine right of access to transmission: continuity of educational pathways, teacher training, adult learning, media, creation and progressive presence in public services. For adults, leave and safety measures for their career paths must allow them to follow intensive training without losing their jobs or social rights, while respecting the State’s competences in the field of labour law.

The Breton people: a reality, not a closed category

The term «Breton people» or «Breton nation» refers to a historical and political community that is aware of its existence, its languages, its culture, and its country. Within the constitutional framework proposed by Yes Breizh, this recognition does not create either ethnic citizenship or privilege based on origin. No one should be forced to define themselves as Breton in order to live in Brittany, and no one should be prevented from participating in its collective life or accessing its rights.

The doctrine adopted is thus that of universal rights exercised within a specific space: the right to learn and use Breton or Gallo, the right to access history and heritage, the right to participate in public decisions.⁵ And the right to benefit from the services as well. The recognition of Brittany does not remove any rights; on the contrary, it obliges its institutions to guarantee them to all and everyone.

7. Jacobin objections taken seriously

An institutional reform is credible only if it addresses its most serious objections. Jacobin critics formulate a structured critique around the indivisibility of the Republic, equality before the law, the risk of community conflict, the ambiguity of competences and the precedent effect. These objections must not be caricatured or dismissed, but addressed.

Position of Jacobin detractors	What she reveals	Answers from Yes Breizh
«A single people implies a single legislator.»	Classical Jacobin conception of national unity: Sovereignty can only be expressed by a single and uniform legislature. It conflates political unity with normative uniformity, while ignoring the idea that a single sovereign people can organize several levels of legislative power.	Yes Breizh distinguishes the unity of the Republic from the uniformity of its organization. The same sovereign framework can recognize several territorial legislators, in defined areas, under the control of the Constitution and the judge. This is the very principle of democratic devolution: deciding in Brittany what legitimately belongs to Brittany, without calling into question the sovereign powers of the State.
Recognizing a «historical, linguistic, and cultural community» creates collective rights and a hierarchy among citizens.	Jacobin distrust of any political recognition of territorial communities: equality is conceived as exclusively individual and abstract. This reading tends to view any historical or linguistic identity recognized by the law as a threat to the indivisibility of the Republic.	Recognizing Brittany as a historical, linguistic and cultural community does not mean creating citizens of different categories or granting ethnic privileges. Yes Breizh defends rights open to all inhabitants of Brittany: access to languages, adapted institutions, democratic participation and protection of a common heritage, in respect of individual equality.
Why Brittany rather than another region?	The logic of territorial uniformity: an institutional evolution is only considered legitimate if it is generalizable to all regions. It denies that history, identity, geography, democratic will, and public needs can justify differentiated statutes.	Because differentiation must be based on the realities and democratic will of each territory, not on a uniform model imposed on everyone. Brittany has an institutional history, a cultural and linguistic identity, a geographical coherence, and its own specific needs. A Breton status would in no way prevent other territories from asking for an evolution corresponding to their situation.
The Corsican autonomy cannot be automatically transferred to Brittany.	The position here is less Jacobin in itself: refusing an automatic transposition is legally reasonable. The Jacobin reflex would appear if this specificity were invoked to deny Brittany, in principle, any ability to obtain, through its own democratic means, an adapted status.	Yes Breizh shares this observation: Brittany does not have to copy Corsica. It must build its own devolution model, negotiated with the State, based on its five historical Départements, its priorities and its democratic will. Corsican autonomy can be a constitutional precedent and a source of inspiration, not a model to be replicated exactly.
Voting on a principle before knowing the details of the responsibilities means signing a blank check.	Opt for a methodical approach rather than rigid Jacobinism. However, the centralizing bias appears if one demands a level of precision from the territory that the state does not always impose on itself, in order to delay or neutralize the very principle of devolution.	Yes Breizh does not ask for a blank cheque. The principle of devolution must be accompanied by a clear architecture: transferable domains, competencies reserved for the State, financial mechanisms, judicial controls, subsidiarity, timetable and procedure for the transfer. The vote in favour of the idea initiates regulated negotiations; it does not equate to an unconditional transfer of responsibilities.
Differentiation breaks down equality.	The Jacobin assimilation of equality to the identity of the rules. It excludes equality through adaptation: treating different situations differently in order to guarantee equivalent rights and public services.	For Yes Breizh, equality does not mean that all communities must have exactly the same powers. Equality consists in guaranteeing the same fundamental rights and an equal dignity for citizens, while allowing for different responses to different situations. Differentiation already exists in French law and can be regulated constitutionally.
Autonomy is a step towards secession.	Traditional Jacobin suspicion of autonomy perceived as a potential threat to national unity. He confuses internal autonomy, which organizes the sharing of competencies, and state sovereignty, which is governed by a different logic.	Autonomy is not secession. The project of Yes Breizh is one of a Brittany endowed with its own powers within a negotiated constitutional framework, with an explicit distribution of competences and guarantees of solidarity. Any subsequent evolution of this nature could only be the result of another democratic and legal process; it should not be assumed in the debate on devolution.
Local power favors baronnies, clientelism and capture.	The centralist presupposition that the state would by nature be more neutral and more protective than the local level minimizes the symmetrical risks of bureaucracy, power concentration, and capture at the national level.	This risk exists at all levels of power and must be addressed by the institutions, not by centralization. Yes Breizh proposes counterpowers: transparency, oversight jurisdiction, ethical rules, limitation of cumulations, independent evaluation, citizen participation and autonomy of local authorities. Proximity also makes decision-makers more identifiable and more directly accountable to citizens.
An autonomous Brittany would centralize everything in Rennes.	A pertinent critique of the risk of regional centralism, but which becomes Jacobinist if it is used to conclude that the only protection against centralization is to keep the powers in Paris. On the contrary, devolution can be conceived as polycentric and subsidiary.	Yes Breizh does not want to replace Parisian centralism with a regional or Nantais one. The devolution must be accompanied by strong internal subsidiarity: competencies guaranteed to communes, intercommunalities and territories, public services distributed across all five Départements, decentralized administrations and mechanisms of equalization. Rennes, for example, could be an institutional capital, not the exclusive center of Brittany.
The reform will be expensive and add a layer of complexity.	Frequent Jacobin reflex: present any decentralization as an additional structure, when devolution can consist of transferring, merging, or removing state competencies and services. The cost should be compared to the current system, not added mechanically to it.	The objective is precisely to avoid an additional layer. The devolution must transfer functions currently exercised by the State, with the corresponding human and financial resources, and allow for simplifications, mutualization, and the elimination of duplications. Its cost must be evaluated through an impact study and monitored by performance and quality indicators for public services.
Language rights could become coercive.	Jacobean fear of a territorial linguistic right being assimilated to an identity constraint. It tends to ignore the fact that a linguistic right can be conceived first as a freedom of use and an obligation of capacity on the part of the public service, without imposing a language on citizens… otherwise French.	Yes Breizh defends linguistic rights, not a linguistic police. Breton, Gallo and French must be able to benefit from a framework of recognition and effective services, with realistic progress in administrative capacity. The citizen must retain their linguistic freedom; the obligation primarily applies to public institutions, which must be able to respond gradually in the recognized languages when this is provided for by law.

8. Fourteen commitments for a responsible Breton status

1. Reuniting Brittany democratically, With a clear procedure for the Loire-Atlantique and the geographical areas concerned.

2. Creating a community with special status and simplify the competencies before adding any institution.

3. Adopting a PADDB⁶ opposable, developed with the Départements (or countries) and periodically revised.

4. Publish a book of competencies distinguishing the reserved, assigned and shared subjects, before any constitutional vote.

5. Transferring complete functions, With staff, data, operators and dynamic resources.

6. Establishing an Assembly of Brittany Elected democratically.

7. Choosing a responsible parliamentary executive, controlled by the Assembly.

8. Guaranteeing financial autonomy and equalization, without fiscal or social dumping.

9. Protecting Breton and Gallo through personal rights, accessible to everyone without identity constraints.

10. Preventing the recentralization in Brittany, by internal subsidiarity and a polycentric distribution of functions.

11. Submitting the whole to the law and evaluation, With jurisdictional controls, transparency, indicators and a review clause.

12. Establishing the status based on dual legitimacy and two consents : an explicit mandate to negotiate, then the approval of the finalized text in Brittany in accordance with the constitutional procedure of the French Republic.

13. Adopting a Fundamental Law of Brittany defining institutions, standards, finances, languages, referendums and revision procedures within the French and European constitutional framework.

14. Installing independent counter-powers and a France-Brittany conference capable of controlling public standards, transfers, charges and integrity.

9. Implementation calendar

Indicative period	Decision	Verifiable deliverables
2026-2027	Institutional audit.	Scenarios, record of competencies, costs, minority opinions, draft guarantees.
2027-2028	Consultation on reunification and a project for a special-status community.	Impact study, transition agreement, preparatory PADDB.
2028-2030	First devolution blocks.	Laws, financial conventions, personnel transfers, public indicators.
2030-2032	Constitutional revision, organic law and statute.	Constitutional text, lists of competences, control mechanism and consultation mechanism.
Starting in 2032	Implementation and first independent evaluation.	Annual report, results table, three-year review and review clause.

For Yes Breizh, this calendar is a method, not a prophecy. It depends on democratic majorities and procedures. No step should be taken unless the competencies, resources, or consent are in place.

10. Indicators of success

Success is not measured by the number of competencies or institutions created, but by their effects. An independent dashboard will include, among other things: decision-making times; certified financing of transfers; the net cost of the new architecture; recourse and conflict of standards; government stability; the territorial distribution of public jobs; the share of decisions taken by countries and communes; user satisfaction; territorial disparities; fiscal sustainability; voter participation; trust; pluralism; voluntary use of languages; carbon footprint and artificialization.

The annual report will distinguish the specific effects of devolution from national trends. It will also publish the failures and corrective measures. At the end of three years, an independent commission will formulate recommendations submitted to the Assembly of Brittany and to the public debate.

Conclusion: Trust through clarity

For Yes Breizh, the institutional question should not be an end in itself. It is valuable because it allows: to decide more accurately, to act faster, to adapt policies and to identify the responsible person.

The proposed choice is demanding. At the central state, it demands that unity not be uniformity. In Brittany, it imposes the renunciation of the posture of impotence: those who have the power must raise resources, arbitrate, publish their results, and answer for their mistakes.

Successful devolution rests neither on exclusive identity narratives nor on the mere denunciation of the central state. It rests on a contract: clearly assigned powers, guaranteed common rights, organized solidarity, comprehensible polycentric institutions, and democratic control at every level. The complete institutional project constitutes the architectural blueprint of this contract; this dossier outlines the essential political choices involved.

Mobilized resources and precautions

Transmitted parts

• Yes Breizh, Breton Statute — Architecture ; Constitutional file ; Work on the Constitution and the Law on Languages ; Law on autonomy and four texts ; A precursor constituent for Brittany.
• Gaël Briand, intervention in the plenary session of the Regional Council of Brittany, December 13, 2023, concerning democratic dispossession, housing, languages, and the Breton people.
• Transcription of an intervention by Benjamin Morel on autonomy, indivisibility, equality and the notion of community.
• François Sauvadet, intervention on centralization and local finances.
• Scottish National Party, Holyrood Election Manifesto 2026, used as a method comparison on the formulation of the democratic mandate and the prior transfer of the powers necessary for a referendum; the SNP’s independenceist objective is not taken up.
• CEVIPOF, Barometer of political trust, vague 17, February 2026, infographics and full report.
• CEVIPOF / Ipsos bva / Jean-Jaurès Foundation / Le Monde, French electoral survey — Municipal elections 2026, March 2026.
• CEVIPOF, notes on municipal elections and proximity democracy, March 2026.
• Worksheet on the distribution of competences, updated on August 22, 2025.
• Breizh Europa, Territorial organization.
• Yes Breizh, Institutional Project of Brittany, consolidated proposal for an autonomous, united and polycentric Brittany, August 2026.

Legal references

• Constitution of October 4, 1958, notably articles 1, 72, 72-1, 72-2 and 89; ;
• General Code of Territorial Collectivities concerning the special status of the collectivities and Corsica; ;
• Decisions of the Constitutional Council No. 91-290 DC of May 9, 1991 and No. 99-412 DC of June 15, 1999; ;
• The most recent parliamentary state of the texts relating to the autonomy of Corsica.
  

Notes and clarifications

1. Centre of Political Research at Sciences Po ↩

2. Elected by UDB and Regions et Peuples Solidaires. ↩

3. If necessary. ↩

4. Because the policy of the central state of ‘land development’ systematically favors the southern-eastern quarter of France, the North and the Paris Region. ↩

5. However, subject to residing there for at least three years and paying their taxes there. ↩

6. Project for Sustainable Development and Planning ↩

The thematic dossiers of Levrig 2027 by Yes Breizh

• 1. Statute, institutions, devolution and Constitution
• 2. Public finances, budget and fiscal autonomy
• 2 bis. Budgetary analysis France – Brittany 5
• 3. The public service in Brittany
• 4. Health in Brittany
• 5. Disability in Brittany
• 6. Education, training and higher education
• 7. Culture, languages and media
• 8. Breton identity, transmission and cohesion
• 9. Housing in Brittany
• 10. Employment, businesses and economic development
• 11. Economy, trade and mobility
• 12. Agriculture and food
• 13. Sea, coast and fishing
• 14. Energy, climate and the ecological transition
• 15. Digitalization and sovereignty
• 16. Security, justice and defense
• 17. Europe and internationally
• 18. Breton Diaspora and international outreach